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Abstract 
We	investigate	perceived	job	security	risk	and	the	distribution	of	non-labour	income	
between	 spouses	 in	 a	 household	 context.	 In	 the	 process,	 the	 restrictions	 implied	
by	 Beckerian-caring	 preferences	 in	 the	 Chiappori	 (2002)	 Collective	 model	 are	
considered,	and	estimates	of	 the	sharing	 rule	are	derived.	The	findings	support	 the	
idea	of	household	formation	as	a	tool	that	caring	partners	use	to	share	risk.	Our	results	
provide	further	insight	as	to	how	unemployment	risk	may	affect	interaction	between	
Australian	spouses.	
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1. Introduction 
A	major	risk	encountered	by	workers	in	the	labour	market	is	the	possibility	of	losing	
their	 job;	not	 least	because	becoming	unemployed	has	serious	consequences	 for	an	
individual’s	consumption,	savings	and	wealth	(Berloffa	and	Simmons,	2003).	The	role	
played	by	unemployment	risk	on	the	decision	making	of	the	individual	 is,	however,	
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substantially	more	complex	when	 that	person	 is	placed	within	a	household	context.	
For	example,	couples	may	adjust	their	hours	of	employment	to	offset	changes	in	their	
partner’s	 employment	 (Altonji,	 1986;	 Juhn	 and	 Potter,	 2007;	 Lundberg,	 1985;	 and	
Mumford	and	Smith,	1999),	which	could	be	viewed	as	behaviour	consistent	with	the	
household	insuring	against	the	risk	of	income	shocks	(Blundell	et al.,	2012;	Apps	et 
al.,	2014	).		
Intra-household	interaction	is	a	focus	of	the	Collective	models	which	appeared	
in	 the	 labour	 supply	 literature	 with	 the	 works	 of	 Chiappori	 (1988,	 1992).	 	 In	 the	
Collective	framework,	the	household	is	an	environment	where	the	respective	spouses	
first	 interact	and	agree	upon	a	sharing	rule	 (e.g.,	 the	sharing	of	 the	household	 total	
non-labour	income	between	the	couple);	and	then	maximize	their	own	utility	functions	
subject	to	their	own	budget	constraints	(for	a	recent	survey	see	Browning	et al.,	2014).	
Our	contribution	to	this	literature	is	to	shed	further	light	on	how	unemployment	
risk	may	affect	interaction	between	spouses.	We	investigate	the	relationship	between	
perceived	unemployment	 risks	 and	 the	 relative	power	 between	 the	members	 of	 the	
couple	 in	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 household.	 This	 is	 achieved	 by	 first	 introducing	 job	
insecurity	 elements	 into	 the	 sharing	 rule	 and	 then	 estimating	 to	 what	 extent	 job	
insecurity	affects	the	distribution	of	power	between	spouses	in	a	household.	In	order	
to	capture	this	effect,	a	specific	version	of	the	Collective	model	proposed	by	Chiappori	
et al.,	(2002)	is	estimated.	
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	section	2	discusses	the	theoretical	model	
developed	by	Chiappori	et al.,	(2002);	section	3	describes	the	data	and	the	sample’s	
characteristics;	section	4	explains	the	econometric	approach	and	presents	the	results;	
and	section	5	concludes.	
	
2. Model 
In	 the	Collective	models	 the	 household’s	members’	 decision	 process	 is	 given	 by	 a	
two-step	procedure.	In	the	first	phase	the	members	of	the	couple	agree	on	a	sharing	
rule	and	they	split	the	total	household	non-labour	income.	This	sharing	is	affected	by	
the	individual’s	relative	power	(sometimes	called	bargaining	strength).	In	the	second	
phase	the	two	individuals	separately	maximize	their	utility	functions	subject	to	their	
own	budget	constraints.	
Following	Chiappori	et al.,	(2002),	let	hi	and	Ci,	for	i=1,2	denote	member	i’s	
labour	supply	(where	0	≤	hi ≤	1)	and	consumption	of	a	private	Hicksian	composite	good	
whose	price	is	set	equal	to	1.	In	addition,	x	denotes	a	K-vector	of	preference	factors	
such	 as	 age,	 gender,	 and	 education	 of	 the	 two	 agents.	Also,	 let	w
1
,	w
2
,	 y	 represent	
the	members’	wage	rates	and	the	household	non-labour	 income.	Finally,	 let	s	be	an	
L-dimension	 vector	 of	 distribution	 factors.	 Distribution	 factors	 affect	 the	 decision	
process	but	don’t	impact	on	the	preferences	or	the	budget	constraint;	for	example,	in	
our	case	exogenous	changes	in	individual	job	insecurity.		
In	 the	most	 general	 framework	member	 i’s	 preferences	 are	 represented	 by	
some	utility	 function	of	 the	form	Ui	 (l	–	h1,	C1,	 l	–	h2,	C2,	x)	and	 the	household	 is	
assumed	to	maximize	a	General	Household	Welfare	Function	(GHWF)	that	can	be	
explicitly	 written	 as	HC=	mU1 +	 (l	 –	m)U2.	 Formally,	 given	 (w
1
w
2
y,s,x)	 there	 exists	
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a	weighting	 factor	0	≤	m(w
1
,w
2
,y,s,x)	≤	1	 assumed	continuously	differentiable	 in	 its	
arguments	such	that	(hi,Ci)	is	a	solution	to	the	program:	
			max						mU1	+	(l	–	m)U2																																																																																																																																																																(1)
subject to
w
1
h1	+	w
2	
h2	+	y ≥	C1	+	C 2,
0	≤	hi	≤	l,				i	=	1,2.
It	is	important	to	note	that	a	change	in	s	does	not	affect	the	Pareto	frontier	but	only	the	
final	location	of	the	optimal	solution	on	it.	
	Note	the	form	of	the	individual	preferences	used	in	program	(1),	Ui	(l	–	h1,	
C1,	l	–	h2,	C2,	x),	imply	that	this	general	version	of	the	Collective	model		cannot	be	
uniquely	identified	from	knowledge	of	just	the	labour	supplies.	There	is	a	continuum	
of	different	structural	models	generating	the	same	labour	supply	functions.	Additional	
identifying	assumptions	are	accordingly	imposed	on	the	model	in	order	to	estimate	the	
Collective	model.	As	shown	by	Chiappori	(1992),	the	main	identifying	assumption	for	
a	Collective	model	to	be	estimated	is	given	by	the	individual	preferences	being	either	
egoistic,	Ui	(l	–	hi,	Ci,	x)	for	i=1,2;	or	caring	in	a	Beckerian	sense,	ui =	Fi[Ui (l	–	hi,	
Ci,	x)	Uj (l	–	hj,	Cj,	x)]	with	i=1,2	and	i	=/	 j.	Note	that	in	the	Beckerian	case	household	
members	care	about	each	other’s	preferences	as	well	their	own.	
Both	 types	 of	 preferences	 are	 discussed	 in	 Chiappori	 et al.,	 (2002).	 The	
Beckerian	 Caring	 Preferences	 impose	 an	 additional	 restriction	 on	 the	 household	
members’	 labour	supply	functions	 (see	equation	(9)).	The	egoistic	assumption	plays	
a	key	role	in	the	formulation	of	the	maximization	problem.	Chiappori	(1992)	proved	
that	whenever	 individual	 utilities	 are	of	 the	 form	Ui	 (l	 –	hi,	Ci,	x),	 then	 (1)	 can	be	
reformulated	as	in	Proposition	1,	as	a	direct	consequence	of	the	Second	Fundamental	
Welfare	Theorem.	
Proposition 1 – Whenever individual preferences are egoistic, then, there 
exists some function j(w
1
w
2
y,s,x) such that (h1,h2,C1,C2) is the solution to the program: 
max						Ui(l	–	hi,C i,	x)																																																																																																																																																																							(2)
subject to
wihi	+	fi ≥	Ci	,
0	≤	hi	≤	l,
where j1 = j and j2 =	y	–	j.
The	two	individuals	have	to	first	agree	upon	j(w
1
w
2
y,s,x).	As	shown	by	(2),	the	sharing	
rule	j i,	represents	the	link	between	the	two	individuals	who	would	otherwise	behave	
independently.	Importantly,	j i	is	not	observable	to	the	analyst	if	the	data	report	total	
household	non-labour	income	and	not	the	shares.	
In	the	Collective	model	it	is	possible	to	identify	j(w
1
w
2
y,s,x)	by	considering	
the	 response	 of	 the	 labour	 supply	 function	 of	 the	 two	 individual	 spouses	 in	 the	
{h1,h2,C1,C1}
{hi,Ci}
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household	to	variations	in	w
1
,	w
2
,	y	and	s.	The	labour	supply	functions	are	assumed	to	
be	continuously	differentiable	and	can	be	written	as:	
h1 =	H1	(w
1
, j(w
1
,w
2
,y,s,x),x);																																																																																								(3)
h2 =	H2	(w
2
, y	–	f(w
1
,w
2
,y,s,x),x);																																																																																		(4)
where	H i(.)	 represents	member	 i’s	Marshallian	 labour	 supply	 function.	 The	 partial	
derivatives	of	the	two	labour	supply	equations	with	respect	to	w
1
,	w
2
,	y	and	s,	generate	a	
system	of	partial	differential	equations.	The	sharing	rule	j(w
1
w
2
y,s,x)	is	then	obtained	
by	integrating	this	system.	Given	the	nature	of	the	solution,	j(w
1
w
2
y,s,x)	is	identifiable	
only	up	to	an	additive	constant	k(x).	This	implies	S
i   
jˆ i ≈	y,	the	sum	of	the	two	estimated	
non-labour	income	shares	is	approximately	equal	to	total	non-labour	income,	and	will	
differ	 by	 the	 additive	 constant	k(x)	which	depends	on	 the	household	heterogeneity	
and	cannot	be	empirically	identified.	The	structure	of	the	two	labour	supply	functions	
makes	 it	 possible	 to	 impose	 testable	 restrictions	 on	 labour	 supply	 behaviour	 and	
recover	 the	 partial	 derivatives	 of	 the	 sharing	 rule	 (see	Chiappori	 et al.,	 (2002)	 for	
further	detail,	especially	Proposition	2).		
We	 explore	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	 within	 the	 household	 by	 assuming	
that	this	distribution	can	be	fully	captured	by	how	income	is	allocated	between	the	
spouses.	Browning	and	Gørtz	(2012)	argue	that	the	concept	of	power	is	defined	not	
only	 in	 terms	of	how	money	 is	 allocated	between	 the	 spouses	but	 also	 in	 terms	of	
leisure.	Using	data	on	the	use	of	time	within	households	(Danish	Time	Use	Survey),	
Browning	and	Gørtz	(2012)		observe	that	in	some	households	the	spouse	that	spends	
more	time	in	the	labour	market	is	also	the	one	enjoying	less	leisure.	There	are	many	
possible	explanations.	For	example,	 there	might	be	some	heterogeneity	in	the	tastes	
for	 leisure	 and	 consumption	within	 the	 household.	Wages	 or	 productivity	 in	 home	
production	may	also	vary	across	the	spouses,	and	that	may	lead	to	differences	in	the	
leisure	 taken.	Ultimately,	 there	may	be	 an	uneven	distribution	 of	 power	within	 the	
household	 such	 that	 the	 low-power	 individual	may	 be	 required	 to	work	more.	The	
intra-household	allocation	of	time	has	also	been	the	focus	of	other	studies	(see	Apps	
and	Rees,	1996;	1997).	Unfortunately,	we	do	not	have	access	to	complete	information	
on	time-use	within	the	household	in	the	HILDA	data	set1	and	so	we	focus	on	the	within	
household	allocation	of	non-labour	income.
	
2.1 Labour supplies: Functional form and parametric specification 
Before	 proceeding	 with	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 Collective	 model,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
specify	 the	 functional	 form	 of	 the	 spouses’	 labour	 supply	 functions.	 	 In	 this	work	
the	 two	 distribution	 factors,	 namely,	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 s	 vector	 that	 appears	 in	
j(w
1
w
2
y,s,x)	 are:	 the	 individual’s	 own	 expected	 job	 insecurity;	 and	 the	 individual’s	
own	worries	about	his/her	 future	employment.	The	unrestricted	semi-log	system	of	
equations	is	given	by	
1	The	HILDA	data	set	provides	some	information	on	time	use	within	the	household	but	does	not	
contain	complete	information	on	the	distribution	of	time	in	the	period.	
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h1 =	a
0
	+	a
1
	log	w
1
	+	a
2
	log	w
2
	+	a
3
y +	a
4
	log	w
1	
log	w
2	
+	a
5
s
1	
+	a
6
s
2	
+	a8
7
X
1
;															(5)
h2 =	b
0
	+	b
1
	log	w
1
	+	b
2
	log	w
2
	+	b
3
y +	b
4
	log	w
1	
log	w
2	
+	b
5
s
1	
+	b
6
s
2	
+	b8
7
X
2
;																	(6)
Equation	(5)	is	the	parameterized	version	of	equation	(3)	and	represents	the	
labour	supply	function	of	the	female	spouse.	The	α
i
’s,	for	i	=	1,...,6,	are	scalars;	a8
7
	is	
a		K-vector		of	parameters;	variables	s
1
	(i.e.	expected	job	insecurity)	and	s
2
	(i.e.	future	
employment	worry)	represent	the	distribution	factors;	and	X
1
	is	a	matrix	consisting	of	
a	set	of	socio-demographic	variables	describing	the	wife.	Analogously,	equation	(6)	
is	the	parameterized	version	of	equation	(4)	and	represents	the	labour	supply	function	
of	the	male	spouse.		
Using	 a	 semi-log	 functional	 form	 is	 standard	 in	 the	 estimation	 of	 labour	
supply.2	Adopting	this	functional	form	allows	equations	(5)	and	(6)	 to	be	expressed	
in	their	unrestricted	form;	the	restrictions	of	Proposition	1	and	2	are	not	imposed	on	
the	system	and	can	instead	be	empirically	tested.	If	the	parameters	(the	α
i
’s	and	β
i
’s	
and)	meet	 the	collective	restrictions,	 then	the	sharing	rule	can	be	derived	up	to	 the	
additive	constant	k(x),	and	for	a	given	k(x)	the	individual	indirect	utility	functions	can	
be	recovered.	This	specification	can	also	be	readily	extended	to	allow	for	interactions	
between	 distribution	 factors	 and	 preferences	 factors.	 The	 generalized	 log-system	
constitutes	a	good	basis	if	one	wanted	to	make	the	whole	system	more	flexible	by,	for	
example,	introducing	higher	order	polynomial	in	log	w
1
,	log	w
2
	and	y.	The	log	form	for	
wages	allows	the	effect	of	w
i
	on	hi
  
to	decrease	as	hi	increases.
2.2 Sharing rule 
Assuming	 the	 Collective	 restrictions	 are	 satisfied,	 and	 given	 the	 spouses’	 labour	
supply	equations	(3)	and	(4)	and	their	empirical	counterparts	(5)	and	(6),	the	partial	
derivatives	of	j	are:	
fw
1
	=
fw
2
	=
fy	 =
fs
1
	 =						a
5
fs
2
	 =						a
6
2	Semi-log	estimation	of	equations	(5)	and	(6)	implies	the	labour	supply	curves	should	be	either	
upward	sloping	or	backward	bending	everywhere.	Empirical	evidence,	however,	 shows	 that	 the	
sign	of	the	slope	may	change	with	the	level	of	the	wages.	This	is	especially	true	in	a	household	
contest	(i.e.	in	a	two-individual	economy	where	the	two	subjects	strictly	interact).	What	happens	
in	such	an	environment	is	that	the	sign	of	∂hi/∂w
i  
changes	both	with	the	level	of		and	with	the	level	
of	w
i 
( j	=/	 i).	
(a
4	
b
1	
+	a
4	
b
4	
log	w
2
)
w
1
1
∆
1
∆
(b
4	
a
2	
+	b
4	
a
4	
log	w
1
)
w
2
a
3	
b
4
∆
b
4
∆
b
4
∆
82
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR ECONOMICS
VOLUME 19 • NUMBER 2 • 2016
where	∆	(a
3
b
4	
–	a
4	
b
3
).	
Solving	this	system	of	five	differential	equations	system,	the	sharing	rule	equation	is	
obtained	as
																																																																																																																																					(7)
f =																																																																															+	k(x).	
Following	the	approach	used	by	in	Chiappori	et al.,	(2002)	the	model	restrictions	are:	
						=							,																																																																																																																					(8)
in	the	case	of	pure	Egoistic	Preferences,	and:	
						=							=							,																																																																																																										(9)
in	the	Beckerian	Caring	Preference	case.	
	
3. Data 
We	use	data	collected	by	the	Household,	Income	and	Labour	Dynamics	in	Australia	
(HILDA)	survey2.	The	HILDA	survey	started	in	2001	and	is	an	annual	nation-wide	
longitudinal	survey	of	Australian	households	occupying	private	dwellings.	For	greater	
detail	on	the	response	rates,	structure,	and	changes	over	time	in	the	HILDA	design	see	
Summerfield	et al.,	(2013).		
HILDA	 collects	 information	 on	 a	 range	 of	 topics	 including	 economic	 and	
subjective	 well-being,	 labour	 market	 dynamics	 and	 family	 dynamics.	 A	 potential	
weakness	 of	 annual	 surveys,	 such	 as	 HILDA,	 is	 the	 failure	 to	 capture	 intra-year	
dynamics.	To	address	this	problem,	HILDA	respondents	are	asked	to	recall	information,	
especially	with	respect	to	labour	market	and	social	security	histories,	over	the	course	
of	the	previous	year.	
A	particularly	attractive	characteristic	of	the	HILDA	survey	is	the	presence	
of	 subjective	 job	 insecurity	 information.	This	 inclusion	 is	 rare	 amongst	 economics	
surveys.	Indeed,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	the	only	other	relevant	surveys	containing	
similar	information	on	employment	prospects	are:	the	Health	and	Retirement	Survey	
(HRS),	conducted	at	the	University	of	Michigan	since	1992;	the	Survey	of	Economic	
Expectations	(SEE),	conducted	at	 the	University	of	Wisconsin-Madison	since	1994;	
and	the	Survey	on	Household	Income	and	Wealth	(SHIW)	conducted	at	the	Bank	of	
Italy	during	the	years	1995	and	1998.	The	problem	with	these	latter	three	surveys,	for	
the	purposes	of	this	study,	is	that	they	either	collect	information	only	at	an	individual	
level	or	they	collect	information	only	for	a	random	sample	of	members	within	each	
household.	This	leaves	HILDA	as	the	preferred	data	source	for	this	study.		
	
1
∆
 b
1
a
4
	log	w
1
	+	a
2	
b
4
	log	w
2
	+	a
4	
b
4	
log	w
1	
log	w
2	
+	a
3	
b
4	
y +	b
4	
a
5
s
1	
+	b
4
a
6
s
2	
 b
5
a
5
 b
6
a
6
 b
4
a
4
 b
5
a
5
 b
6
a
6
3	This	paper	uses	unit	record	data	from	the	Household,	Income	and	Labour	Dynamics	in	Australia	
(HILDA)	Survey.	The	HILDA	Project	was	 initiated	 and	 is	 funded	 by	 the	Australian	Government	
Department	of	Social	Services	(DSS)	and	is	managed	by	the	Melbourne	Institute	of	Applied	Economic	
and	Social	Research	Melbourne	Institute).	The	findings	and	views	reported	in	this	paper,	however,	are	
those	of	the	authors	and	should	not	be	attributed	to	either	DSS	or	the	Melbourne	Institute.	
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3.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The	Collective	models	 are	 a	 class	 of	 generally	non-nested	models:	 each	Collective	
model,	while	sharing	some	common	features	with	 the	others,	 is	unique	 in	 terms	of	
the	model	restrictions	and	population	of	interest.	The	reference	population	analysed	
in	this	work	is	given	by	the	Collective	model	developed	by	Chiappori	et al.,	(2002).	
The	selection	criteria	are:	being	an	employee4;	and	being	one	of	the	two	members	of	
a	couple	family	(with	or	without	children)	who	are	married	(legally	or	de-facto).	The	
sample	is	also	restricted	to	households	whose	members	are	younger	than	55.			
We	pool	waves	2	to	9	of	the	HILDA	survey	data	to	estimate	the	Collective	
model.	 The	 first	 wave	 of	 data	 is	 excluded	 due	 to	 lack	 information	 on	 pertinent	
variables;	and	waves	post	2009	have	been	excluded	due	to	 the	 impact	of	 the	recent	
global	recession.5	The	years	2002	to	2009	(inclusive)	are	associated	with	a	period	of	
stable	economic	growth	in	Australia.	These	sampling	restrictions	and	those	associated	
with	the	explanatory	variables	leads	to	the	identification	of	6,613	couples.
Summary	 statistics	 for	 the	 sample	 of	 interest	 are	 reported	 in	 Table	 1.	 On	
average	the	males	are	slightly	older	than	the	females,	and	the	women	are	slightly	better	
educated.	The	men	are	typically	working	almost	45	hours	per	week;	unsurprisingly	
this	is	some	four	hours	more	than	they	would	like	to	work.	In	contrast,	the	women	are	
averaging	almost	33	hours	a	week.	The	men	also	have	considerably	higher	average	
hourly	wages	than	the	women.	The	difference	of	17	log	wage	points	between	men’s	
and	women’s	wages	is	consistent	with	the	empirical	literature	on	the	labour	market	in	
Australia	(Chzhen	et al.,	2013).	The	men	tend	to	work	in	the	managerial	and	technical	
occupations	 whilst	 the	 women	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 work	 as	 professionals,	 clerical-
administrators	or	personal	service	providers.		Table	1	also	shows	that	a	relatively	large	
proportion	of	women	are	employed	on	casual	contracts,	while	men	are	more	commonly	
employed	on	a	permanent	basis.	Women	tend	to	be	employed	in	the	education,	health	
and	 retail	 services	 sectors	whilst	men	 are	more	 typically	 found	 in	manufacturing,	
public	administration	and	construction.				
We	 use	 two	 measures	 of	 job-insecurity.	 The	 first	 measure	 captures	 the	
individual	household	member’s	own	expected	job-insecurity.	The	respondent	is	asked	
the	following	question:	“What	do	you	think	is	the	per	cent	chance	that	you	will	lose	
your	job	during	the	next	12	months?	(That	is,	get	retrenched	or	fired	or	not	have	your	
contract	renewed).”	A	value	of	0	indicates	the	individual	is	certain	of	retaining	their	
job,	whereas	a	value	of	100	suggests	the	individual	is	certain	of	losing	his/her	job	in	the	
next	12	months.	The	second	measure	is	of	future	employment	worry:	the	respondent	is	
asked	to	agree	on	a	scale	from	1	(totally	disagree)	to	7	(totally	agree)	with	the	following	
statement:	“I	have	a	secure	future	in	my	job”.	A	binary	variable	was	created	and	coded	
as	1	if	the	response	is	less	than	the	midpoint	4	and	0	otherwise.	Men	perceive	their	
employment	prospects	to	be	(slightly)	but	significantly	more	uncertain	than	women	in	
our	sample	(see	Table	1).	The	correlation	between	the	spouses’	job	insecurity	is	low,	
however,	averaging	around	0.07	across	the	four	possible	combinations	of	the	two	job	
insecurity	measures.	
4	The	estimation	of	this	particular	version	of	the	Collective	model	requires	both	members	of	the	
household	to	supply	a	positive	number	of	hours	of	work.	This	means	that	any	issue	related	to	non-
participation	is	ruled	out.	
5	2010	saw	the	impact	of	the	global	recession	in	Australia	with	a	substantial	growth	in	unemployment	
(Junankar,	2014).	
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Table 1 - Selected individual and household characteristics   
 
 Men Women
Individual Variables Mean Sd Mean Sd
Age	 40.34	 8.86	 38.37	 8.69
Hours	of	Work	 44.66	 9.51	 32.58	 12.31
Desired	Hours	of	Work	 41.35	 8.68	 30.30	 10.30
Ave	Hourly	Wage		 26.87	 12.02	 22.48	 9.84
Log	Ave	Hourly	Wage	Rate	 3.20	 0.41	 3.03	 0.39
Expected	Job	Insecurity	 8.96	 18.69	 7.68	 17.70
Overall	Market	Insecurity	 10.34	 3.08	 9.33	 2.92
Future	Employment	Worry	 0.15	 0.35	 0.13	 0.34
Schooling	(Years	of)	 13.08	 2.85	 13.20	 2.62
Household	Variables	 	 Mean	 Sd	
Household	Size	 	 3.34	 1.17	
Total	Dependent	Children	 	 0.83	 0.99	
Household	Non-labour	Income	 	 	7705.69	 27609.76	
Regions	 	 Freq	 Percent
New	South	Wales	 	 1891	 28.6
Victoria	 	 1701	 25.7
Queensland	 	 1486	 22.5
South	Australia	 	 573	 8.7
Western	Australia	 	 477	 7.2
Tasmania	 	 208	 3.1
Northern	Territory	 	 64	 1.0
Australian	Capital	Territory	 	 213	 3.2	
Section	of	State	
Major	Urban	 	 4178	 63.2	
Other	Urban	 	 1598	 24.2	
Rural	 	 837	 12.7
Employment	Contract	 Freq	 Percent	 Freq	 Percent
Employed	on	a	Permanent	basis	 5592	 84.6	 4807	 72.7
Employment	on	a	Casual	Basis	 415	 6.3	 1130	 17.1
Other	(e.g.	Fixed-term	Contract)	 606	 9.2	 676	 10.2
Occupation	 	 		 		 	
Managers	 1123	 17.0	 516	 7.8
Professionals	 1645	 24.9	 2282	 34.5
Technicians	and	Trades	 1239	 18.7	 231	 3.5
Community-Personal	Service	 501	 7.6	 917	 13.9
Clerical-Administrative	 673	 10.2	 1654	 25.0
Sales	 327	 4.9	 535	 8.1
Machinery	Operators	and	Drivers	 672	 10.2	 55	 0.8
Labourers	 430	 6.5	 421	 6.4
Industry	 	 		 		 	
Agriculture-Fishing-Forestry	 132	 2.0	 66	 1.0
Mining	 205	 3.1	 30	 0.5
Manufacturing	 996	 15.1	 297	 4.5
Electricity-Gas	Supply	 150	 2.3	 20	 0.3
Construction	 533	 8.1	 84	 1.3
Wholesale	Trade	 300	 4.5	 150	 2.3
Retail	Trade	 382	 5.8	 632	 9.6
Accommodation-Restaurants	 166	 2.5	 296	 4.5
Transport	 465	 7.0	 122	 1.8
Communication	 201	 3.0	 187	 2.8
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The	 measure	 of	 overall	 market	 job	 insecurity	 makes	 some	 allowance	 for	
gender	based	employment	differences	in	occupation	and	industries;	it	is	constructed	
by	 taking	 the	 average	 of	 the	 individuals’	 “expected	 job	 insecurity”	 variable	 across	
all	 possible	 151	 combinations	 between	 occupations	 and	 industries.	 The	 individual	
hypothetical	market	is	identified	by	a	specific	combination	represented	by	his/her	own	
occupation	and	his/her	own	industry.	For	example,	an	individual	who	is	a	technician	
and	working	in	health	care	may	operate	in	a	different	market	from	a	technician	working	
in	the	finance	sector.	Men	are	again	found	to	have	higher	perceived	job	insecurity	than	
women	using	the	market	based	measure,	although	the	gap	between	the	genders	is	a	
little	lower.		
On	 average	 the	 households	 have	 slighter	 less	 than	 one	 dependent	 child	 (a	
resident	child	aged	under	15),	with	total	household	size	averaging	3.34	people	suggesting	
that	many	households	have	 another	 adult	 living	with	 them.	Finally	household	non-
labour	income6	is	relatively	high	in	Australia	as	a	wealthy	OECD	country,	however,	
there	is	also	considerable	variance	in	this	measure	indicating	high	levels	of	inequality	
(Mariotti	et al,	2015).
	
4. Estimation  
As	discussed	above,	the	sharing	rule	plays	a	crucial	role	in	Collective	Labour	Supply	
models.	 This	 rule	 is	 recovered	 if	 the	 Collective	 restrictions	 (either	 (8)	 or	 (9))	 are	
satisfied.	In	the	following,	individual	utilities	are	modelled	as	caring	in	a	Beckerian	
sense	and	equations	(5)	and	(6)	are	estimated	subject	 to	 the	restrictions	reported	 in	
equation	 (9).	 The	 non-linear	 constraints,	 as	 specified	 in	 equation	 (9),	 can	 be	 dealt	
6	Household	financial	 year	 non-labour	 disposable	 income	 calculated	 as	 the	 difference	 between	
household	financial	year	gross	incomes	(including	windfall	and	other	income	but	excluding	wages)	
less	all	household	financial	year	taxes,	measured	in	2005	Australian	dollars.	To	calculate	net	values,	
the	tax	rates	indicated	in	the	HILDA	Usermanual	(in	accordance	with	Wilkins,	2009)	are	applied	
to	 relevant	 taxable	 income	 after	 deductions.	The	 components	which	 the	Australian	Tax	Office	
(ATO)	 treats	 as	 taxable	 income	 are:	 wages	 and	 salaries,	 business	 income,	 investment	 income,	
private	pensions	and	taxable	Australian	public	transfers.	Taxable	public	transfers	are	obtained	by	
subtracting	from	public	transfer	income	Family	Tax	Benefit	Parts	A	and	B,	including	Child	Benefit	
and	Child	Tax	Relief;	Maternity	Allowance,	Maternity	Payment,	the	Disability	Support	Pension	
and	estimated	Rent	Assistance,	none	of	which	are	taxable.	
Table 1 - Selected individual and household characteristics (continued)
 Men Women
	 Freq	 Percent	 Freq	 Percent
Finance	 259	 3.9	 351	 5.3
Rental-Hiring-Real	Estate	 80	 1.2	 82	 1.2
Profess	Scientific	Technical	 398	 6.0	 432	 6.5
Administrative-Support	 80	 1.2	 168	 2.5
Public	Administration	 938	 14.2	 491	 7.4
Education-Training	 613	 9.3	 1387	 21.0
Health	Care	 342	 5.2	 1572	 23.8
Recreation	Services	 110	 1.7	 77	 1.2
Other	 263	 4.0	 169	 2.6
Source:	HILDA	Dataset	–	Pooled	Sample	(Wave	2	to	Wave	9).
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with	 in	 the	usual	manner	by	algebraic	substitution.	Thus	rather	 than	estimating	 the	
parameters	b
4
	and	b
5
	the	following	quantities	are	estimated:	
g
1
	=											;			g
2
	=										.																																																																																													(10)
This	reduces	the	dimensionality	of	the	parameter	vector	by	two	(as	two	constraints	are	
imposed	on	the	problem).	The	two	labour	supply	equations	are	reformulated:	
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where	g
1
	and	g
2
	as	given	by	(10)	are	estimated	 in	place	of	b
4
	and	b
5
.	Equations	 (11)	
and	 (12)	 are	 estimated	 simultaneously	 and	 the	 restrictions	 are	 imposed	 directly	 in	
the	 estimation	 process.	 The	 (asymptotic)	 standard	 errors	 se(gˆ
1
)	 and	 se(gˆ
2
)	 needed	
for	 constructing	 confidence	 intervals,	 conducting	 tests	 and	 making	 inference	 are	
computed	using	the	Delta	Method.	
The	two	labour	supply	functions	are	estimated	using	the	Generalized	Method	
of	 Moments	 (GMM).	 This	 approach	 is	 preferred	 since	 it	 is	 able	 to	 consistently	
estimate	 the	standard	errors	even	 in	 the	presence	of	heteroskedasticity	of	unknown	
form	(unlike	Maximum	Likelihood).	The	GMM	estimator	exploits	the	assumption	that	
the	 instruments	are	exogenous,	and	 the	estimator	 is	 robust	 to	heteroskedasticity	 (of	
unknown	form)	and	allows	for	possible	correlation	between		e
1
	and	e
2
.	
5. Results 
Selected	 results	 for	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 labour	 supply	 functions	 are	 presented	 in	
Table	2.	The	models	are	well	defined	and	the	coefficients	are	consistent	with	the	priors	
discussed	 above.	 If	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 paper	was	 on	 labour	 supply,	we	would	 go	 on	
to	present	 relevant	elasticities	and	discuss	 the	 results	more	 fulsomely.	However,	 for	
our	purposes,	the	emphasis	is	on	the	parameter	estimates	as	a	means	to	calculate	the	
sharing	rule.		
We	 proceed	 by	 considering	 whether	 Australian	 households	 behave	 in	 an	
efficient	manner	according	to	the	Collective	assumptions.	The	Collective	restrictions	
(equation	9)	are	accordingly	tested	on	the	estimated	unrestricted	model	and	the	results	
are	reported	in	Table	2,	columns	1	(for	the	wife)	and	2	(for	the	husband).	These	results	
provide	support	for	the	efficiency	assumptions	behind	the	Collective	model	in	this	case.	
	Subsequently,	the	Collective	restrictions	are	imposed	directly	on	the	GMM	
objective	function	as	discussed	in	Section	4	above.	Table	2	provides	the	results	for	
the	 Collective	model	with	 Caring	which	 is	 represented	 as	 a	 system	 of	 non-linear	
equations	and	estimated	with	non-linear	GMM.	Columns	3	and	4	of	Table	2	report	
the	parameter	 estimates	of	 (11)	 and	 (12).	The	final	 column	 (column	5)	 reports	 the	
implicit	 parameter	 estimates	 of	 the	 sharing	 rule	 (7).	 It	 is	worth	 stressing	 that	 the	
implicit	parameters	of	 the	sharing	rule	are	obtained	as	non-linear	combinations	of	
the	previously	estimated	(constrained)	parameters	derived	from	the	estimation	of	(11)	
and	(12).	The	(asymptotic)	standard	errors	of	the	sharing	rule	parameters	estimates	
are	computed	using	the	Delta	Method.	
 b
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a
4
a
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6
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Table 2 - Parameter estimates
 Unrestricted model Constrained model
     Sharing Rule
 Wife Husband Wife Husband with Caring
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)
log	w
f
	 -0.874**	 -1.129***	 -1.076***	 -0.909***	 5400.741**
	 (0.444)	 (0.401)	 (0.388)	 (0.260)	 (2474.172)
log	w
m
	 -0.961**	 -1.128***	 -1.145***	 -0.905***	 5325.301**
	 (0.403)	 (0.408)	 (0.350)	 (0.267)	 (2396.712)
log	w
f
	×	log	w
m
	 0.299**	 0.350***	 0.360***	 0.282***	 -1674.494**
	 (0.133)	 (0.125)	 (0.116)	 (0.081)	 (766.352)
Nonlabour	income	 -0.0002**	 0.00003	 -0.0002**	 0.00001	 0.955***
	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.311)
Distribution Factors	 		 		 		 		 	
Expected	Job	Insecurity	 -0.0002**	 -0.0001*	 -0.0002**	 -0.0002**	 0.942*
	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.544)
Future	Employment	Worry	 -0.025***	 -0.019***	 -0.025***	 -0.020***	 116.294**
	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (51.694)
Over-identifying	restrictions:	 5.391	(p=0.980)	 6.803	(p=0.977)	 	
Observations:	 6613	 6613	
		 	
HILDA	Dataset	–	Pooled	Sample	(Wave	2	to	Wave	9).	Notes:	Significance	levels:	10%	(*),	5%(**),	
1%(***).	Control	variables	in	Xi	are:	age;	number	of	dependent	children;	general	health;	industry;	
occupation;	and	urbanisation
When	dealing	with	labour	supply	in	a	household	context,	possible	endogeniety	
of	wages	should	be	considered.	If	unobserved	individual	characteristics	are	positively	
correlated	with	wages,	spurious	correlation	between	the	regressors	and	the	error	term	
in	the	labour	supply	equations	is	an	issue	7.	Our	choice	of	instruments	is	influenced	by	
Mroz	(1987),	the	set	of	(excluded)	instruments	consists	of	time	dummies,	second	order	
polynomials	in	education,	and	the	interaction	of	age	and	education	8.
As	 shown	 in	 Table	 2,	 the	 set	 of	 instruments	 passes	 the	 over-identifying	
restrictions	 test.	 An	 additional	 test	 was	 conducted	 to	 check	 for	 the	 weakness	 of	
instruments.	As	explained	in	Stock	and	Yogo	(2001)	and	Stock	et al.,	(2002),	this	test	
involves	 the	 construction	 of	what	 they	 call	 the	 concentration	 parameter.	Given	 the	
different	set	of	instruments	used	for	the	two	labour	supply	equations,	the	concentration	
parameter	was	computed	for	the	two	labour	supplies.	Their	closeness	to	the	critical	
values	 provided	 in	 Stock	 and	 Yogo	 (2001)	 support	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 chosen	
instruments	and	their	strength.	Moreover,	given	the	weighting	matrix	used	in	equation	
7	The	 dataset	 provides	 information	on	 gross	weekly	wage	 and	weekly	 hours	 of	work.	Average	
hourly	wage	rates	are	 the	ratio	of	 these	 two	variables.	Measurement	error	 in	 the	hours	of	work	
measure	may	lead	to	a	spurious	negative	correlation	between	this	average	hourly	wage	measure	
and	the	dependent	variable.	
8	As	discussed	in	Pencavel	(1986),	there	is	a	debate	in	the	labour	supply	literature	whether	education	
variables	should	be	used	as	instruments	for	the	wage	rates	or	as	exogenous	regressors	in	the	labour	
supply	equation.	It	is	common	practice	to	use	schooling	as	an	instrument	for	wage	rates	whenever	
other	instruments	are	not	available.	This	approach	has	been	followed	in	this	work,	and	education	
has	been	used	as	an	instrument.	
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(14),	the	GMM	estimator	used	for	the	estimation	is	the	efficient	one	among	the	class	
of	GMM	estimators,	and	is	also	robust	to	heteroskedasticity	(of	unknown	form)	and	
to	any	possible	correlation	between	the	two	errors	in	the	labour	supply	equations	and	
across	observations	(in	order	to	exploit	the	panel	structure	of	the	data).	
The	 dependent	 variable	 and	 non-labour	 income	 are	 rescaled	 (they	 were	
divided	by	100	and	1,000,	 respectively).	This	 rescaling	 is	necessary	so	 the	scale	of	
the	sharing	rule	and	the	scale	of	household	non-labour	income	match	each	other.	As	
explained	in	Section	2	and	as	represented	in	(2)	the	sharing	rule	function	j(.)	gives	the	
household	non-labour	income	share	that	goes	to	the	individual	and	adds	to	his/her	own	
individual	labour	income	before	the	spouses	maximize	their	utilities.	While	household	
non-labour	income	is	information	that	is	usually	available,	the	share	j i	 that	goes	to	
the	individual	(as	represented	in	(2))	is	not	available	and	is	computed	according	to	the	
sharing	rule	j(.).	This	implies	the	scale	of	the	household	non-labour	income	share	j i 
must	match	the	scale	of	the	household	non-labour	income	y.
As	discussed	above,	the	distribution	factors	(i.e.	the	elements	of	the	s	vector)	
are:	 the	 individual’s	 own	 “Expected	 job	 insecurity”;	 and	 the	 individual’s	 own	
“Future	employment	worry”.	The	control	variables	included	in	the	analysis	are:	age;	
number	of	dependent	children;	industry;	occupation;	urbanisation;	and	an	indicator	
of	general	health.	
The	estimates	of	the	structural	components	of	the	two	labour	supply	equations	
can	be	compared	with	those	obtained	by	Chiappori	et al.,	(2002).	The	estimates	for	the	
wife’s	labour	supply	equation	obtained	in	this	work	are	similar	to	those	obtained	in	
Chiappori	et al.,	(2002).	In	contrast,	the	results	related	to	the	husband’s	labour	supply	
equation	are	quite	different.	In	particular,	the	estimates	related	to	the	wage	rates	are	
negative,	as	opposed	to	Chiappori’s	estimates	that	are	positive.	The	negativity	of	the	
wage	rates	also	contrasts	with	the	empirical	literature	on	male	labour	supply	according	
to	which	the	response	of	labour	supply	to	increase	in	wages	is	positive.	To	check	the	
robustness	of	the	estimates	for	the	male	equation,	different	specifications	of	the	male	
labour	supply	equation	have	been	estimated	 (both	 individually	and	 jointly	with	 the	
wife’s	labour	supply).	In	all	the	specifications	the	labour	supply	response	to	increase	in	
wages	is	negative	(for	them).	This	result	may	be	explained	by	the	specific	features	of	
the	selected	sample.	Table	1	indicates	that	these	Australian	men	would	rather	supply	
less	hours	of	work	if	allowed	to	do	so.	This	might	suggest	that	their	position	on	the	
labour	supply	curve	is	on	the	backwards	sloping	section.	
What	is	of	particular	note	is	the	effect	of	the	two	self-assessed	job	insecurity	
variables	on	 the	sharing	 rule.	Here	 the	 interpretation	 is	carried	out	 from	the	wife’s	
perspective,	 but	 the	 same	 interpretation	 can	 be	 conducted	 from	 the	 husbands’	
perspective.	 The	 implicit	 parameters	 of	 the	 sharing	 rule	 suggest	 that	 when	 the	
perceived	employment	prospects	of	the	wife	change,	and	she	becomes	concerned	about	
the	future	security	of	her	job,	she	gets	an	additional	portion	of	non-labour	income	from	
the	husband.	This	is	compatible	with	the	type	of	utility	function	chosen	for	this	work,	
namely	“caring	in	a	Beckerian	sense”.	Since	the	members	of	the	couple	operate	in	a	
“caring”	context	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	the	economic	risks	are	shared	between	the	
members	of	the	couple.	
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6. Conclusion 
The	study	exploits	a	Collective	model	of	labour	supply	to	consider	the	household	as	
a	risk	sharing	tool	that	individuals	use	to	cover	against	potential	economic	risks.	The	
focus	is	the	household	as	an	environment	and	not	as	an	economic	agent.	An	application	
is	made	addressing	(perceived)	individual	job	insecurity.	The	job	insecurity	measures	
are	incorporated	into	the	model	under	the	form	of	distribution	factors.		The	restrictions	
implied	by	Beckerian-caring	preferences	in	the	Chiappori	(2002)	Collective	model	are	
considered,	and	estimates	of	the	sharing	rule	are	derived.		
The	 results	 support	 the	 idea	 of	 household	 formation	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 (caring)	
individuals	have	in	order	to	share	possible	risks	they	could	encounter	throughout	their	
lives.	Moreover,	the	collective	behaviour	of	the	Australian	households	under	analysis	
has	been	tested	and	confirms	their	efficient	behaviour.	A	negative	shock,	thought	of	
in	terms	of	an	increase	in	individual	job	insecurity,	is	found	to	be	related	to	the	(re)
distribution	of	power	between	the	members	of	the	couple.	The	results	are	consistent	
with	the	idea	of	caring	individuals	and	show	how	the	spouse	affected	by	the	negative	
shock	is	supported	by	the	relatively	more	job-secure	partner,	supporting	the	idea	of	
household	 formation	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 caring	 partners	 use	 to	 share	 risk.	Our	 findings	
provide	further	insight	as	to	how	unemployment	risk	may	affect	interaction	between	
Australian	spouses.
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